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Sacramental Place Poetry Rooted in the Carolinas

As I’ve been working on my PhD Comprehensive Exams this summer, I’ve been frequently asking myself what it is I’m actually trying to write.

That sounds like the sort of question I should have answered a long time ago, especially after years of blogging, teaching, preaching, consulting, podcasting, and now reading for a PhD in ecology, spirituality, and religion. But the truth is that sometimes you only recognize the shape of your work after you’ve been doing it for a while (which I often said to my middle and high school students as they journeyed). You look back over a few poems, a few essays, a few notes written in the early morning before the kids are fully awake, and you begin to notice the threads.

In the midst of this, a phrase came to me while working in the yard to gather oak, maple, and walnut branches after a summer thunderstorm:

Sacramental Place Poetry Rooted in the Carolinas.

I like that term because it gives an expression to something I’ve been working on for years without pinning it down too tightly. I don’t think of my poems as “nature poems” in the abstract. I’m not usually writing about nature as scenery or background, and frankly don’t like the term (or “wilderness”). I’m writing about places that have addressed me in some way.

Obviously, there’s the black walnut tree in our yard here in Spartanburg. Cedar roses gathered from the front yard for an anniversary with Merianna, tobacco fields giving way to pine. Red clay and rain in the Piedmont. The Pee Dee. The Lowcountry. Rivers, ditches, old roads, churchyards, school mornings, family errands, and the small objects children leave behind in the grass.

Those things aren’t decorative, but are part of the grammar of my life.

I grew up in South Carolina, left for a while, and have spent a good portion of my adult life trying to understand what it means to belong to a place without pretending that belonging is simple. The Carolinas are beautiful, but they certainly aren’t innocent. Every landscape here carries memory. Indigenous presence and erasure. Enslaved labor and tobacco money. Church bells with pine plantations. Family stories. Stormwater ditches. Kudzu. Development. Black walnuts and cedars. The land remembers more than we do, and much of my writing has become an attempt to listen (before I offer something of an explanation).

That’s probably why trees show up so often in my poems and essays. Trees have become, for me, a kind of theological tutor. Instead of rushing or arguing in the way we argue, they receive weather, injury, children, birds, insects, drought, and time. They aren’t passive as some Aristotelians might veer towards, though. They’re constantly negotiating relation.

Roots, fungi, water, light, decay, growth, fruit, shade. There’s a whole world of attention happening in a tree, and most of it takes place beneath the level of our human perceptions or notice.

My own daily practice beneath the black walnut in our yard has taught me that attention isn’t a mood any more than creativity, with all of its weirdness and fickle muse, is. Attention is a discipline. Some mornings, nothing dramatic happens. A squirrel fusses while a Northern Cardinal cuts across the yard. A walnut falls. A child’s toy sits where it was abandoned the day before. The grass is wet while my coffee gets cold. But given enough mornings, these small things become more than small things. They become a way of being instructed by the world.

That’s where the sacramental language comes in for me.

By sacramental, I don’t mean that every leaf is a sermon illustration, or that every tree needs to be turned into a symbol as quickly as possible. I mean (almost) the opposite. The sacramental begins when the world is allowed to be itself deeply enough that it discloses more than itself, as Merleau-Ponty has taught me. A walnut remains a walnut while a cedar cone remains a cedar cone, no matter how much I want to apply an abstract level of emotion like love onto it. Red clay remains red clay. But in their full presence, they also carry relation, memory, gift, wound, and grace.

That has shaped the way I think about theology, too. I’m an ordained minister, and I still believe that Christian language has something true and necessary to say about the world. But I’ve become much less interested in theology that hovers above place and more interested in theology that has dirt under its fingernails as I’ve aged. The cross, for instance, has become harder for me to imagine only as an abstract doctrine. It was actually wood before it was a symbol. It was tree before it was theology. The Cross belonged to the same creation that Christian faith too often treats as stage scenery for human salvation.

So when I write about the Cross as a ruined tree, or grace as something greening through what has already been given, I’m not trying to be clever. I’m trying to recover something that should have been obvious all along, in my opinion… faith happens somewhere. Salvation, if we are going to use that word (another one of those words I struggle with, much like nature and wilderness), cannot mean escape from this world that God loves. It must involve learning how to see, inhabit, repair, and love this world more truthfully.

That’s also why family appears so often in what I write. My poems are full of trees, but they are also full of children’s laughter, marriage, errands, school mornings, half-finished meals, books, socks in the grass, and the ordinary clutter of a house where life is actually happening.

I don’t want a spirituality that requires me to leave all of that behind in order to find depth. The depth is there already. The trick is learning how to notice it without sentimentalizing it.

A cedar rose gathered from the yard can become a way of thinking about marriage. A walnut falling in the grass can become an invitation. A child’s forgotten shovel near the fence can become part of the liturgy of a morning. These aren’t grand revelations in the usual sense. To me, they’re more like reminders that nothing here is only here.

The Carolina part matters, too. I don’t want to write as if place were interchangeable. The Piedmont is not the Lowcountry. The Pee Dee is not Appalachia by any means. Spartanburg is not Marion County, though both live in me now (and certainly not Greenville, despite how much some folks in elected offices here seem to want that to be the case). Each place has its own ecology of memory. Each place teaches attention differently. The Carolina landscape has formed my imagination in ways I am still trying to understand: the humidity, the pine straw, the old church Baptist and Presbyterian and Methodist languages and songs, the roads between small towns, the sound of summer insects, the uneasy layering of beauty and violence, tenderness and history.

Maybe that is why poetry feels increasingly necessary to me in my present context. Prose can explain, and I do love prose for that. Essays let me follow an idea, trace a history, build an argument, and hopefully make a convincing case. But poetry lets me stay closer to the moment before explanation closes around it. Poetry gives me a way to let the walnut fall, to let the cedar open, to let ruin become river before I decide too quickly what any of it means.

I don’t know that I set out to become a person who writes poems of place. I had no idea I’d have numerous poems published in anthologies and literary magazines. I certainly didn’t set out to write “sacramental place poetry rooted in the Carolinas,” because that phrase only arrived rather unexpectedly after the work had already begun. But I can see now that much of what I write is an attempt to practice a kind of ecological attention. I’m trying to attend to the more-than-human world, to the household, to memory, to Christian faith, to the old wounds and stubborn grace of this region, and to the ways all of these keep speaking through one another.

That may be why I keep returning to the same images of trees, rain, children, ruin, roots, rivers, crosses, fields, and birds. The “ordinary” holiness of a yard in the morning.

I’m writing because I want to remember that the world is alive with address.

I’m writing because I want to learn how to receive that address without rushing to master it.

I’m writing because the Carolinas have made claims on me, and I suspect I will spend the rest of my life learning how to answer.

These days, that answer often comes as a poem.

And with that, here’s a poem I wrote:

The Walnut Keeps Time in Spartanburg

At the edge of the yard in Spartanburg, where the black walnut leans into its own weather, morning arrives without asking to be believed.

The children have left their small offerings behind: a sun-faded ball in the clover, a plastic shovel near the fence, one damp sock folded by rain into the grass.

The tree receives them all with the old patience of wood, lifting nothing, refusing nothing, making a chapel from shade and green husk.

I sit beneath it with coffee gone cool and a book open in my lap, trying again to learn what the world says before I ask it to mean something.

The walnut does not hurry. It darkens its fruit slowly, lets squirrels argue overhead, lets ants keep their bright roads through the red clay.

Somewhere beyond the yard, traffic gathers itself toward school and work, toward errands, bells, the ordinary liturgies of another Carolina morning.

But here, under this rough crown, time is not a line so much as a widening ring, the hidden labor of root and rain, the way a life grows inward before anyone sees what it has become.

I think of the cross, not polished and lifted high, but once a tree, once sap, once leaf, once a body drinking light from the same sun that warms my hands.

Maybe grace is like that, not arriving from elsewhere, but greening through what has already been given: this yard, this breath, these children growing louder, this marriage of errands and mercy, this Piedmont soil holding more memory than I know how to carry.

A walnut falls. Then another.

The sound is small, almost comic, a wooden knock against the day’s closed door.

Still, I hear it as invitation.

Pay attention, it says. Nothing here is only here. Even the bruised fruit splitting in the grass is busy becoming food, stain, shadow, and prayer.

Crabapple not Cherry

Left the local plant store excited about planting my new Cherry tree on Fathers’ Day but realized (after digging a hole) that I’d come home with a Crabapple. That’ll do as well.

Malus angustifolia (Narrowleaf Crab, Narrowleaf Crabapple, Southern Crabapple, Wild Crab, Wild Crabapple) | North Carolina Extension Gardener Plant Toolbox:

The native Southern crabapple is a shrub or small tree, 20 to 30 feet in height. Its native habitat is pine woodlands or mixed woods, in open to medium densities. Its branches spread outward to form a rounded open crown. Some states consider this native to be threatened or “of concern” due to losses of native habitats or inadequate reseeding.

Baptists and Women Pastors in the News Again

I grew up Southern Baptist and am still a Baptist (and an ordained one at that!).

My ordination certificate hangs next to my desk here and was signed by two incredible women who were leaders in the church that ordained me after seminary.

Thank goodness for the folks at BWIM for constantly doing the work they do as the SBC continues down the path of politicization, misguided reformed theologies, and “christian nationalism”…

“The organization Baptist Women in Ministry, which works with female ministers in a variety of Baptist denominations, issued a statement lamenting the vote.

“We express our solidarity with the women in ministry who have been harmed by this vote, the hateful rhetoric and propaganda leading up to the vote, and the damaging theology the vote represents,” it said. “Women in ministry deserve affirmation, respect, and the opportunity to follow God’s call. We are heartbroken that they have been denied those fundamental freedoms in the process of this vote.”’

Southern Baptists vote to advance a formal ban on churches with women pastors – CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2026/06/10/us/southern-baptists-women-pastors-vote

Comprehensive Exams Begin

Just a short note to say that I’m very excited to share that I’ve finished up my coursework towards my PhD at CIIS and am advancing into my two comprehensive exams. Once those are completed (hopefully by the end of the year), I’ll be in full dissertation mode. Exciting!

Here’s my reading list if you’re interested in what I’ll be reading and working on the next few months…

Displaced Forms: Assyrian Reliefs, Ecological Intentionality, and the Ethics of Perception

Twenty years ago (2006), my first book, Asia Has Claims Upon New England: Assyrian Reliefs at Yale, was published by Yale University after my time there as a graduate student working at the Yale University Art Gallery. It’s a short study of how carved stones from the palace of Assurnasirpal II at Nimrud came to New Haven and entered the religious, educational, and institutional imagination of nineteenth-century America. That earlier work focused on Assyrian palace reliefs, Protestant missionary culture, biblical archaeology, and the strange afterlives of objects once they are removed from the worlds that formed them. The original publication is available here, with catalog records available through Yale/WorldCat and the Smithsonian Institution.

This new work, “Displaced Forms: Assyrian Reliefs, Ecological Intentionality, and the Ethics of Perception,” returns to that earlier project from the standpoint of my current doctoral work in ecology, spirituality, and religion at CIIS. I ask what happens when a form is separated from its world, whether that form is an Assyrian relief, a sacred tree carved in gypsum, a black walnut in a Spartanburg yard, or a river translated into capacity. The essay brings the Assyrian reliefs into conversation with ecological phenomenology, Edith Stein’s account of form, and my ongoing work on ecological intentionality. Its central claim is simple, I think… displaced forms continue to make claims upon us, and to perceive them rightly requires more than possession, preservation, or admiration. It requires learning to receive the worlds still speaking through them.

Ecological Intentionality and the Metaphysics of Living Form

Ecological Intentionality and the Metaphysics of Living Form continues my ongoing work at the intersection of phenomenology, ecological theology, and process-oriented metaphysics. Beginning with sustained attention to the black walnut tree in our backyard here in Spartanburg, this paper asks whether non-human organisms can be understood as bearers of interiority rather than as merely complex mechanisms. Drawing on Henri Bergson’s account of duration, Raymond Ruyer’s theory of absolute survey, Edith Stein’s phenomenology of empathy, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s ontology of embodiment and flesh, I work to develop “Ecological Intentionality” as a way of describing the living world as active, self-organizing, and meaningfully present. The paper argues that our ecological crisis is not only a failure of policy or management, but also a failure of perception, and that any deeper ecological repair must begin with learning to see living form more ontologically “true.”

Mexico City’s Sinking Problem

We’re going to see so much of this in the coming years as NISAR develops more standard models…

One of the planet’s biggest cities is sinking so rapidly it’s visible from space | CNN:

Between October 2025 and January 2026, during Mexico City’s dry season, NISAR mapped the movement of the ground beneath the city. Its findings reveal that parts of the city are sinking at a rate of around 0.8 inches a month — that’s more than 9.5 inches every year.

Areas most affected include the Benito Juarez International Airport, the city’s primary airport.

Attention as Ecological Practice: AI Data Centers and the Limits of the Anthropocene

The paper is called “Attention as Ecological Practice: AI Data Centers and the Limits of the Anthropocene,” and it starts close to home… literally. A $2.8 billion computing facility is going up on South Pine Street in Spartanburg, in the shell of an old Kohler plant. A few miles away, a different $3 billion proposal, Project Spero, named after South Carolina’s state motto, drew hundreds of residents to County Council chambers in opposition before the developer withdrew. A third site remains in the works.

The argument I’m making is that the crisis these proposals represent isn’t only an energy and water problem (though it is that). It’s a crisis of ecological perception, and the way the promotional apparatus around data center development is specifically designed to make planetary costs invisible while foregrounding jobs, tax revenue, and American competitiveness. The Tyger River watershed, the regional grid’s carbon intensity, the cumulative water withdrawals from the Broad River basin… none of that appears in a Governor’s press release.

Drawing on Yves Citton’s account of attention as a distributed, politically structured field, alongside Francis’s Laudate Deum, Donna Haraway’s contact zone concept, and Merleau-Ponty’s embodied perception, I try to make the case that what happened in those County Council chambers, a community briefly and collectively organizing its attention against a machinery designed to prevent exactly that noticing, points toward something worth taking seriously. Not as a substitute for structural and regulatory transformation, but as its necessary condition.

You can’t protect what you can’t see. The paper tries to think through what it would take to keep these systems visible before decisions are made rather than after.

Ecology (Without) Fields: Toward a Different Ontology of the Cosmos

I taught AP Physics and Physics and Physical Science (along with Environmental Science, Life Science, and Earth & Space Science) for almost twenty years. I’d introduce the field concept early in the course, and everything that notion seems to clarify. The gravitational field, the electromagnetic field, the wave collapse, and wave functions, etc., all work better as long as you have a playing field. Much like our sports today. There’s a value assigned to every point in space, smoothly varying, mathematically tractable, and extraordinarily powerful as a predictive tool. Students felt the elegance of it, and so did I. You could describe the behavior of matter across any scale with the same formalism. The cosmos, it seemed, was fundamentally a manifold of field values, and once you understood that, you understood something deep about reality itself.

I am no longer sure that’s true. Not because the physics is wrong (it isn’t, at least in our human understanding of the Cosmos with our current framing), but because I have come to suspect that the field picture, however useful, is describing something derived rather than something fundamental. And I think the place I’m standing right now, on the bank of Lawson’s Fork in the South Carolina Piedmont, is better evidence of what the cosmos actually is than any field equation.

That’s a large claim. Let me try to earn it or unpack this at least.

In 1980, the philosopher Hartry Field published a book called Science Without Numbers that caused something of a stir in the philosophy of mathematics. His argument was deceptively simple, I think. Basically, the fact that mathematics is indispensable for doing physics doesn’t mean that mathematical entities (numbers, functions, sets) actually exist. Mathematics might be extraordinarily useful without being true, much like some would claim about religion. Field called this position fictionalism, and he went on to demonstrate, technically, that you could reformulate Newtonian gravitational theory without any reference to numbers at all, replacing numerical values with purely relational predicates borrowed from geometry.(1) The numbers, he showed, were conservative over the underlying physical facts… they generated no new physical information beyond what the relational structure already implied. They were a powerful fiction, not a fundamental reality.

Field’s project was aimed at numbers. But the argument licenses something further. If indispensability for prediction is no guarantee of ontological fundamentality, then the same skepticism can be turned on the field descriptions that physics has inherited and extended since Maxwell (my favorite) and Einstein. The electromagnetic, gravitational, and quantum fields are extraordinarily useful for prediction. They are not, on that account alone, fundamental features of reality. They might be conservative over something more primordial… something that field theory represents without quite reaching. The question is what that something might be.

Henri Bergson spent much of his philosophical career pressing exactly this question against the physics of his own time, and his answer still appeals to many of us. For Bergson, the deepest problem with mathematical physics is not its precision but its treatment of time. A field value is assigned to a point in spacetime, a frozen coordinate, mathematically exact and stripped of duration. The continuous field is the smooth assembly of such frozen moments across an abstract manifold. This, Bergson argued, is the intellectualist distortion of real time, lived time, the time of actual processes, being not a coordinate. It is duration, qualitative, irreversible, thick with the past, that has accumulated in it. (2) A field value at a spacetime point doesn’t capture duration necessarily but does eliminate it.

In physics, this means the field of formalism is, in a specific and precise sense, conservative with respect to durational facts. It extracts from the living reality of process exactly what is measurable (such as position, magnitude, rate of change) while leaving the ontological substrate of durée untouched and undescribed. Bergson is not saying physics is wrong. He is saying it is a useful abstraction from something more realistic or deeper, and that mistaking the abstraction for the fundamental thing is a category error with consequences.

At Lawson’s Fork here in Spartanburg, duration is not an abstraction. The creek carries its own past in its channel morphology, its sediment load, its riparian forest, and the chemical memory of every storm and drought since the last ice age. What I encounter when I sit at the shoal is not a field value. It is the thickness, with the accumulated duration of a place that has been doing this longer than the Piedmont has been the Piedmont. You can assign temperature, velocity, and dissolved oxygen values to the water at this point. You cannot assign a field value to what it means for this water to be here, now, still.

Gilles Deleuze sharpens this. In Difference and Repetition, he argues that extensive quantities (like the kinds of quantities field theory assigns to points in space ) are actualizations of something more primordial, such as intensive difference. (3) A temperature gradient is intensive. It has direction, it drives the process, and it is the condition of heat flow before it becomes measurable as a rate. A temperature field value is the extensive representation of that intensity, which you get when you cancel the gradient into a number. The number is real and useful. But the gradient came first, ontologically. The difference is more fundamental than the magnitude.

For ecology, this is almost self-evident. What ecosystems run on is intensity from thermal gradients, hydrological pressure differentials, chemical potential differences across membranes and soil horizons, and trophic gradients from light-saturated surface to benthic dark. These intensive differences are what ecological work is about. They drive nutrient cycling, species distribution, evolutionary pressure, and succession. The field descriptions represent these intensities by extending them into magnitudes, thereby systematically concealing what is ontologically prior. Ecology, properly understood, is a science of intensive differences and similarities. Field theory is the science of extensive magnitude. Obviously, they are not describing the same level of reality.

Alfred North Whitehead made this argument in a different way, and Michael Epperson’s more recent work connecting Whitehead’s process metaphysics to quantum mechanics has recently given it new precision. Whitehead’s central claim in Process and Reality is that the extensive continuum, or the spacetime manifold that underlies field theory, is not primitive but derivative. (4) It is constituted by the mutual implication of what Whitehead calls actual occasions as irreducibly local events of experience in a broad sense, each taking account of its environment, each contributing its achieved definiteness to the world that follows. The field is the abstract pattern that emerges from the creative advance of actual occasions. It is real, but it is not where reality begins.

Epperson’s contribution is to show that this Whiteheadian picture is not merely a philosophical preference, but it resolves genuine problems in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. The wave function, in Epperson’s reading, is not a field in physical space at all. It is a description of potentiality, the structured possibility space of an actual occasion prior to its determination. The so-called collapse of the wave function is the creative advance from potentiality to actuality and the event in which an occasion achieves its definiteness in relation to its environment. (5) The field formalism is conservative over this event structure as it generates the right predictions without describing what is actually occurring at the level of individual occasions.

What Whitehead and Epperson together suggest is that the cosmos is made of events, not fields. Events that are irreducibly local, durational, relational, and in some broad sense experiential, events that take account of their context rather than merely occupying coordinates in it. This is ontologically closer to an ecosystem than to a manifold.

Here is where plasma physics enters, and the argument takes on a different weight.

Plasma is the dominant state of matter in the observable universe, accounting for something in the range of ninety-nine percent by volume. Stars, the interstellar medium, the vast filamentary structures of the cosmic web… all plasma. And plasma physics is, irreducibly, the physics of collective relationships. A plasma cannot be well described by treating particles as discrete entities moving through a background field. Its behavior is dominated by collective phenomena such as Alfvén waves, magnetic reconnection events, Debye sheaths, current sheets, and filamentary structures that arise from the simultaneous mutual interaction of charged particles at every scale. The plasma doesn’t have properties so much as it enacts them through a collective process(es).

Hannes Alfvén, who won the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1970 for his work in magnetohydrodynamics, was himself sharply critical of the tendency to privilege mathematical elegance over the messy relational reality of plasma behavior. He thought cosmological models built on clean field equations were systematically misleading about what cosmic matter actually does. (6) Alfvén was a physicist making a philosopher’s complaint, as well, that the abstraction has been mistaken for the thing.

A plasma is, ontologically, more like a watershed than like a Newtonian gravitational field. It has memory in the sense that it is encoded in its magnetic field topology, the way Lawson’s Fork has memory encoded in its channel morphology. It responds to disturbance through cascading collective reorganization rather than smooth field-theoretic propagation. It is constitutively far from thermodynamic equilibrium, as are living systems, sustained by the continuous throughput of intensive difference. The Alfvén wave is not a perturbation of a background field. It is the medium itself moving, doing something together, the way a flood pulse is the creek itself responding to what has happened upstream.

If ninety-nine percent of the visible cosmos is plasma, then the “clean” physics of particles and fields is actually the physics of the exceptional cases, such as the cold, dense, low-energy corners of reality where matter settles into the forms our terrestrial instruments first encountered as we experience. The cosmos is not, predominantly, a manifold of field values. It is predominantly a tissue of collective, intensive, durational process. Which is to say, it is predominantly something more like ecology.

Let me try to state the thesis clearly, because I want to be precise about what I am and am not claiming.

I am not claiming that field theory is false or that its predictions are unreliable. They are not. I am claiming, following Field’s nominalist license, that the indispensability of field descriptions for prediction is no guarantee of their ontological fundamentality. Field showed this for numbers. The same argument extends to the field descriptions themselves, I think. Fields are conservative about a more fundamental substrate they represent without quite reaching it.

That more fundamental substrate, I am suggesting, has the following features… it is intensive rather than extensive, durational rather than coordinatized, constituted by actual events of mutual encounter rather than persistent substances in a container space, and irreducibly place-specific rather than homogeneously law-governed. These are the features that Bergson recovers when he insists on duration against spatialization, that Deleuze recovers when he insists on intensity against extensive magnitude, that Whitehead recovers when he insists on actual occasions against the continuous manifold, and that Alfvén gestures toward when he insists on the relational complexity of plasma against the elegance of field equations.

They are also the features that ecology investigates. Not ecology as our current applied physics, as the working out of biochemical field gradients in living systems, but ecology as first philosophy and the study of how living systems constitute their places through intensive, durational, relational process.

What I encounter at Lawson’s Fork is not merely complex field theory. It is something ontologically prior to field theory as a tissue of encounters, each with its own duration, each irreducibly local, each constituted by the intensive differences that drive it. The watershed is doing what the cosmos is doing, at a scale I can stand beside and attend to. The cosmos is not, at its most fundamental level, a field. It is more like a watershed, with duration extending all the way down, an intensive difference expressing itself in process, place, and encounter.

That isn’t mysticism (maybe it is?). It is, I think, what physics is actually showing us, once we stop mistaking the conservation of the formalism for a description of what is fundamentally real.


(1) Hartry Field, Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 1–30. Field’s central demonstration is that Newtonian gravitational theory can be reformulated using only relational predicates, betweenness and congruence relations among spacetime points, without quantifying over real numbers or other abstract entities.

(2) Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 1–45. The critique of spatializaton is developed most fully in Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory, but Creative Evolution gives the most direct statement of duration as irreducible to coordinate time.

(3) Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 222–261. The distinction between intensive and extensive quantity is central to Deleuze’s account of individuation and his critique of representational ontology.

(4) Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology, corrected ed., ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978), 61–82. Whitehead’s account of the extensive continuum as derivative from actual occasions is developed in Part II.

(5) Michael Epperson, Quantum Mechanics and the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (New York: Fordham University Press, 2004), 145–187. Epperson’s most concentrated argument for wave-function collapse as Whiteheadian concrescence is in Chapter 5.

(6) Hannes Alfvén, “Cosmology: Myth or Science?” Journal of Astrophysics and Astronomy 5 (1984): 79–98. Alfvén’s critique of mathematical cosmology in favor of plasma-based observational models runs through much of his later work, including Cosmic Plasma (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1981).

Einfühlung: Stein, Ruyer, and Bergson

There’s a moment (you’ve had it, I’ve definitely had it) when you stop in the middle of something like a walk and feel, with a certainty that precedes any argument, that something is happening in the organism a few feet away from you. Not that it is moving, or making noise, or occupying space in a way that catches your eye. It’s something more interior than that. A stillness that isn’t empty and a kind of attention in the world that is not yours.

It could be a crow on a fence post, watching you with that particular corvid watchfulness that doesn’t feel like surveillance so much as being assessed. It could be a stand of white oaks at the edge of a parking lot, their roots negotiating some underground arrangement you’ll never see. It could be a box turtle holding perfectly still in the leaf litter while you stand two feet away, the two of you caught together in something that doesn’t quite have a name.

You feel it, and then you feel slightly embarrassed about feeling it, because the dominant story we’ve inherited says that whatever is happening over there is happening in the dark and that the lights of inner experience are a human franchise, or at best a mammalian one, and that the crow and the oaks and the turtle are performing the outward signs of life without anyone home to experience them. The embarrassment is cultural, but the feeling is older.

I’ve been thinking about Edith Stein lately, and about what she might say to this moment.

Stein’s contribution to philosophy, at its most concentrated, is a theory of how we ever know another mind at all. She called it Einfühlung, or empathy, though the German carries something richer than the English… literally, a feeling-into. Her 1917 dissertation (written under Edmund Husserl, in the phenomenological tradition, before WW1 had finished) asked a question that seems obvious until you try to answer it… how do I know that you have an inner life?

It’s not how I infer it, or simulate it, or project it from my own case. How do I know it in the primary, pre-reflective, perceptual sense that I know there is a table in front of me or that the light has gone warm and late? Her answer was that empathy is itself a mode of perception. I don’t reason my way to your interiority, but I perceive it, the way I perceive depth in a visual field. The perception can be mistaken, refined, or enriched. But it is perceptual first.

What interests me so much is that Stein was careful about something most readers slide past because she distinguished between empathy as an act (I reach toward you) and empathy as a structure (there is something there to reach toward). The act depends on the structure. I can only empathize with something that has an interior to meet. And she was explicit that this interiority is not identical to the consciousness humans experience. Rather, empathy is a more basic feature of what it means to be a subject at all, to have an inner life that is genuinely yours, from which you encounter the world.

The question she didn’t fully pursue, and I think this is because the intellectual world she was working in hadn’t yet given her the tools or even vocabulary in terms of ecological intentionality, is what it would mean to extend that structure beyond the human. What if the crow is a subject? Not a metaphor for subjectivity, not a cute approximation of it. Actually, a locus of interior life, capable of being met?

Raymond Ruyer was a French philosopher working in the mid-twentieth century who was, for a long time (until very recently), almost unread outside of France, until Deleuze cited him, and then, later a group of philosophers, including Alain Badiou and Quentin Meillassoux started to take him seriously, and then he was rediscovered again by thinkers working on biology and consciousness. His central claim is strange and precise in a way… every living form exercises what he called absolute survey or a kind of self-enjoying, self-forming awareness that cannot be reduced to spatial extension.

This sounds mystical, but it isn’t. It’s more of a biological claim. The embryo developing into an organism isn’t executing a genetic program the way a computer executes code. It is surveying itself, holding its own form in view, orienting its development toward what it is becoming. The cell is not merely processing information, but it has a kind of first-person orientation toward its own activity. This isn’t a capacity that emerges at some threshold of neurological complexity, but it’s a feature of living form as such. The amoeba surveys. The developing limb surveys. I’d argue the mitochondria do the same. There is no organism (or division or formative part of it) without some minimal version of this self-enjoying interiority.

What this means for Stein’s question is significant. If Ruyer is right, then there is genuinely something there, some interior to be met, in every living organism (and we can extend that to its parts and even down to the atomic or quantum level if thought out). Empathy isn’t being extended beyond its proper domain when we feel it toward a turtle or an oak. It is operating precisely as Stein described and perceiving an interiority that is actually present. The embarrassment was a category error.

Henri Bergson adds the temporal dimension. His notion of durée, or duration as lived time, describes how every living (maybe more-than-living) thing carries its past forward in a genuinely creative, not mechanically determined, way. The organism is not a static configuration that happens to move; it is a memory in motion, accumulating its history in a way that shapes its encounter with each new moment. The bird knows its territory the way your body knows how to ride a bicycle as a kind of lived past that has become part of what it is, rather than an explicit piece of information stored and retrieved.

This matters for empathy because it gives the encounter thickness. When you stop and feel that something is happening in the organism (or rock?) a few feet away, what you are meeting is not just a present configuration. You are meeting a duration, and an unfolding, an other with its own temporal interiority, its own accumulated past pressing forward into the present. The feeling of interiority you perceive is not a projection. It’s the trace of that duration registering on your own perceptual field.

Stein, Ruyer, and Bergson are not saying the same thing, of course. Stein is doing phenomenology and describing the structure of the perceptual act. Ruyer is doing philosophy of biology by describing the structure of living forms. Bergson is doing philosophy of time by describing the structure of living memory. But they triangulate on something that, taken together, amounts to a fairly serious challenge to the dominant story… that empathy across species is possible not because we are projecting human experience onto non-human life, but because interiority is a feature of life itself, graded and various, and the perceptual capacity to meet it is something we actually have.

There is a spiritual dimension to this that I can’t ignore or try to pass over without mentioning.

Stein herself became a Carmelite nun and was eventually martyred at Auschwitz along with her sister. She was killed as a Jew, having been born into a Jewish family and having converted to Catholicism after reading Teresa of Ávila in one long night of encounter with a text. She never treated phenomenology and spirituality as separate projects. For her, the capacity to perceive another’s interiority was not merely a cognitive achievement. It was a form of participation in the ground of being and a way that consciousness opens toward what is genuinely other, which she eventually understood in terms of the soul’s movement toward God.

I am not trying to import that theological framework wholesale. But something in it strikes me as exactly right when I stand in the Carolina Piedmont landscape and feel that quality of attention coming back at me from the world. The embarrassment I described at the beginning… the cultural reflex that says you are projecting, anthropomorphizing, romantically confused… that anxious embarrassment assumes that the proper direction of consciousness is inward, toward the self, and that any apparent opening toward the world is a kind of sentimental error.

Stein’s phenomenology and the biological philosophies of Ruyer and Bergson suggest otherwise. The opening toward the other is not an error. It is the structure of consciousness itself and the capacity to be oriented toward an interiority that is genuinely not yours, to receive it without collapsing the difference between you. And if that capacity extends, as I believe it does, to the more-than-human world… then what we wrongly call “nature” is not a backdrop to the drama of human consciousness but a field of genuine subjects, each carrying its own duration, each available in some degree to the kind of participatory perception Stein was describing.

This is where the spiritual layer or dimension becomes unavoidable, at least for me. Because if the world is structured this way, and if there is really something happening over there, and if we have a perceptual capacity to meet it, then the question of how we inhabit the Piedmont, how we attend to the shoals and the hemlocks and the red-tailed hawk quartering the field at dusk, is not merely an aesthetic or ethical question. It is something closer to a contemplative one. The attention itself is a form of participation. The capacity to stop and feel that something is happening over there, and to let that feeling be more than embarrassment, is a practice… not a conclusion.

Stein did not survive to work out the full implications of what she had begun. Ruyer died in 1987, still relatively obscure here in the United States universities and colleges, and in mainstream thinking. Bergson, at least, was famous in his time, though his reputation later suffered the usual eclipse that attends thinkers who insist on the reality of time and memory against the reductionist program (especially after the Einstein debate). But the three of them together sketch something I keep returning to in my own lived experience… the world is not dark. The lights are on in there. And we have always known how to read them; we just stopped trusting ourselves to do so.

The crow on the fence post is still watching you. The box turtle has not moved. The oaks have not stopped their underground negotiations.

What you feel, standing there, is not nothing. It is, if Stein is right, a genuine perceptual act, the meeting of your interiority with another. If Ruyer is right, there is something in the turtle that is doing something not entirely unlike what you are doing: orienting toward its own form, surveying its situation, being present to its own being. If Bergson is right, the turtle is carrying a duration, a history, a lived past that shapes this present moment of its encounter with you.

None of this requires you to believe that the turtle is having human thoughts, or that the oak is happy or sad when you walk by, or that the crow is pondering your moral character (though I am genuinely uncertain about that last one). It requires only that you take the feeling seriously, not as projection, not as sentimentality, but as perception. As the beginning of a different kind of attention to the world we actually inhabit.

The Piedmont here in South Carolina is full of subjects, their histories, and lived time. We have always lived among them. Learning to meet them, without collapsing the difference or dismissing the encounter, is perhaps the oldest spiritual practice there is.

Trump and 2 Chronicles 7:14

I wish more people in the United States would read the Bible earnestly. Trump reading 2 Chronicles 7:14 is certainly a take (as is doing this performative political experience at the Museum of the Bible)…

Trump Will Participate in a Marathon Bible Reading – The New York Times:

America Reads the Bible will run from 9 a.m. to 9 p.m. for a week, starting with Genesis 1 on Sunday and ending with the last chapter of Revelation on Saturday evening. Most participants will read their passages live at the Museum of the Bible in Washington, but some high-profile participants prerecorded their segments.

What the Black Walnut Knows

My teacher / friend / kin / Juglans nigra

I have been intently watching the black walnut in our backyard for just over a year, and I am still not sure I know what it is doing.

That sentence probably sounds strange. We have words for what trees do, from photosynthesis and transpiration to allelopathy and mast production, and the black walnut is particularly well-documented in this regard. Its roots secrete juglone, a toxic chemical compound that harms many neighboring plants, meaning it does not merely occupy space but actively shapes the community around it. It is doing something, in the measurable sense. We have instruments for this.

But I mean something else by the question. I mean, what is the walnut doing from the inside?

I started “tracking” (being with) this tree as part of a graduate seminar in my PhD studies in January 2025, a practice of almost daily observation, written reflection, or just sitting “with.” The assignment was simple enough at the time… return to the same organism at the same location over an extended period of time and attend carefully. No agenda. No hypothesis to confirm. Just attention, sustained and patient, as a discipline in itself.

What I did not expect was how much of that practice would consist of watching the tree appear to do nothing.

Through November and into December, the walnut shed its compound leaves in long, slow stages, the leaflets dropping before the central stalk, the stalks yellowing and releasing one by one until the branches stood bare against the gray Piedmont sky. January brought ice once and a good deal of snow yet again, a glaze that made the bark look lacquered, every ridge and furrow filled with light. February was mostly stillness. I would stand at the edge of the yard in the cold and take notes and feel, some mornings, faintly absurd… a man in his late 40’s with a notebook watching a dormant tree, waiting for something that might not come.

The bark was the only thing that changed, and then only when it rained. The walnut’s bark is deeply furrowed, almost architectural in its ridging, dark gray-brown in dry weather. When rain comes, the furrows darken first, then the ridges, the whole surface shifting toward black, toward something that looks almost wet and alive in a way the dry bark does not. I began to look forward to rainy mornings specifically. The tree seemed more present to itself somehow, more legible, though I could not have said what it was saying.

Then, this past week, in early April, the first buds appeared.

Not leaves just yet… just the swelling at the branch tips, a greening at the nodes, the faint suggestion of what is coming. After five months of apparent stillness, the tree is doing something visible again. And what surprised me was not the buds themselves but my response to them as something close to relief, or recognition, as if the tree had confirmed something I had been quietly doubting all winter.

Which raises the question again, in a different way. What was the walnut doing in February? Was it dormant (which is to say, was it doing nothing), or as close to nothing as a living thing can come? Or was it doing something for which we simply do not have good instruments?

The philosopher Henri Bergson spent much of his career arguing that the deepest problem in how we think about living things is that we borrow our categories from physics. We understand matter in terms of isolable parts, reversible states, and spatial positions. We understand organisms the same way as machines with components, as systems with inputs and outputs, as mechanisms whose behavior can in principle be mapped and predicted. What we lose in this borrowing, Bergson thought, is time. Not clock time, not the time we measure, but duration… the continuous, irreversible, accumulating character of a life actually being lived.

A stone has no past in the relevant sense. You could, in principle, reverse all its molecular states, and it would be the same stone. An organism cannot be reversed. It carries its history in its tissues, its timing, its chemistry. The black walnut in my yard is not the same tree it was in January, not because something dramatic has happened, but because it has continued, because duration has moved through it and left its mark in ways that no instrument fully captures.

The French philosopher Raymond Ruyer, writing in the mid-twentieth century, pushed this further. An organism, he argued, is not a surface that can be observed from outside, but it is what he called an “absolute surface,” a domain equipresent to itself, holding its own form together through something like immanent self-attention. Not a machine surveyed by an engineer. A form that surveys itself. The walnut in February, bark darkening in the rain, held its form from within and was not dormant so much as equipresent to itself in ways I was only beginning to notice.

This is what the buds in early April are telling me, I think. Not that the tree has woken up, as if it were sleeping before. But that what looked like stillness was in fact a kind of accumulated tending and the slow work of a living form carrying its past forward into a new season, doing something for which dormancy is not quite the right word.

There is a philosophical tradition, running back at least to Plotinus in the third century C.E., that holds contemplation to be not an exclusively human act but the fundamental activity of all living things. Plants, animals, even the generative forces of nature itself… all are understood, in this tradition, to produce form through a kind of silent, attentive self-coincidence. Not thinking in the way we think. But not nothing, either. A mode of presence to one’s own form, and through that form, to the whole of which it is an expression.

I find I cannot dismiss this idea when I am standing in front of the walnut in April, watching the buds swell. It is too easy, and I think finally too dishonest, to say that what the tree is doing is merely chemical, merely mechanical, merely the sum of its processes. Something in the act of sustained attention resists that reduction. Not because attention is mystical, but because it is precise — and precision, held long enough over a living thing, keeps turning up more than mechanism accounts for.

The juglone in the walnut’s roots is not random cruelty. It is a claim on the surrounding soil, a shaping of the community according to the tree’s own requirements, or, as ecologists call it, allelopathy, and what I am tempted to call, less technically, intention. Not conscious intention in the way I intend things. But a directedness. A form that knows, in some sense, what it needs and moves toward it.

I do not know what the walnut knows. I am not sure that formulation is even quite right. But after a year of watching the bare winter branches, the bark darkening in rain, the five months of apparent stillness, and now these first buds opening in early April like a sentence the tree has been composing all winter, I am less certain than I was that the question is a category error.

The tree is doing something. I am trying to learn how to see it.

Further Reading

(feel free to message if you’d like a copy of any of these but not able to purchase)

On trees and plant intelligence

On duration, living form, and the philosophy

On attention as ecological practice

On Black Walnut specifically

“Salzburg is no place for my talent.”

I was fortunate to study Beethoven (my favorite) and Mozart in Vienna and Salzburg during my Sophomore year at Wofford College. That experience changed the way I live, my view of music and history, and my trajectory. Fascinating little vignette into Mozart’s life here…

Mozart Wouldn’t Be Mozart Without These Three Objects – The New York Times:

The exhibition and its accompanying catalog cover the composer’s entire life and legacy, but much of it is devoted to his foundational years in Salzburg, with objects that collectively illustrate how a boy of seemingly miraculous talent became the Mozart we know today. Here are three of those artifacts.

The Great Turning

I’m taking The Great Turning course with Prof. Kelly at CIIS now as part of my PhD studies, and thought I’d share this incredible reflection on the life and work of Joanna Macy who co-taught the course with him and continues to have ripples of impact even though she’s passed over (and who many of us look to now as one of the guiding Ancestors even if we were never in her physical presence)…

CONSPIRING WITH JOANNA MACY – Emerge:

By whatever name, however, the new age that is upon us echoes the mythic image of a “new Heaven and new Earth” announced in the last book of the Bible. And true to the title of that last book – Apocalypse or Revelation – the new age is increasingly apocalyptic, in two senses. Most obviously, there is the prospect of worldwide devastation through the mutually reinforcing processes of global heating, mass extinction, and civilizational collapse. Paradoxically, but true as well to the etymology of the word “apocalypse,” the new age is also one where the veil has been lifted, and the fundamental truth of interbeing and the revelation of our common cosmic and Gaian origins and destiny is obvious for those with eyes to see. Tragically, however, there are still many who do not see, blinded as they are by the three poisons of hatred, greed, and delusion…

The Great Turning is not an alternative to collapse, but a passage through. As an evolving vision and commitment, it shapes and ripens us as we make our way through the rubble of industrial growth society. This passage can be seen as a kind of planetary initiation, a collective rite of passage to the possibility, at least, of a human culture in harmony with a greater life of Gaia, and through whom we have our being. (Kelly and Macy 2021, p. 207) 

What If AI Learned from Forests Instead of Empires?

I linked to a recent piece this week that highlighted the growing popularity of an open-source project called Edict, built on the ancient Chinese “Three Departments and Six Ministries” model. Instead of imagining AI agents as a kind of flat group chat where everyone talks at once and somehow arrives at a solution, these developers have looked to imperial bureaucracy for inspiration. They’ve built systems where agents deliberate through ordered layers, defined roles, and structured channels of authority.

There is something genuinely insightful there. Anyone who has spent time watching current multi-agent systems stumble around knows that simply putting five bots in a room and asking them to collaborate is not much of a theory of intelligence. It is often just noise dressed up as emergence. The appeal of a more ordered model makes sense. Hierarchy can reduce confusion. Structure can improve coordination. Clear roles can produce better outcomes than endless recursive brainstorming.

I find myself wondering whether both of these dominant models… the flat Silicon Valley “everyone brainstorms together” approach and the hierarchical “imperial court” approach… may be trapped inside the same basic mistake.

Both assume that intelligence is mainly a matter of well-organized agents. That assumption seems really too narrow to me.

My own work has led me again and again toward a different starting point. Through my studies in ecology, phenomenology, theology, and process thought, I keep returning to the possibility that intelligence does not begin with isolated entities that then enter into relation. It begins in relation itself. Perception is relational. Attention is relational. Meaning is relational. Even empathy, if we take it seriously, is not simply a private feeling inside one mind about another mind. It is an opening toward another center of experience through a shared world.

That matters for how we imagine and even construct AI.

If our models of machine intelligence begin with discrete agents, each assigned a role and operating as an independent unit, we may already be building on the wrong foundation. We may be importing assumptions from bureaucracy, management theory, and industrial organization into domains where those models can only take us so far. We may be constructing administrative systems and calling them intelligence.

What if a better model is not the boardroom or the court, but the forest?

I do not mean that in the lazy sense of saying “nature is good” or “technology should be more organic.” I mean something more specific. A forest is not simply a collection of individual trees standing near one another. It is a field of relations unfolding across time. Trees, fungi, soil microbes, insects, moisture, roots, decaying matter, shade, slope, heat, and season all participate in a dynamic web of exchange and constraint. Nothing is fully self-contained. Nothing simply commands the rest. At the same time, it is not chaos. It is patterned, but not centrally controlled. It is differentiated, but not rigidly bureaucratic.

That seems much closer to how real intelligence often works.

Recent research on mycorrhizal fungi has only deepened this intuition for me. These microscopic fungal threads move nutrients, carbon, water, and signaling compounds through the soil in ways that are astonishingly complex. A forest is not just what we see above ground. It is also the dense and largely invisible life below our feet. It is memory in the soil. It is exchange without spectacle. It is cooperation and competition held together in a larger field of becoming. If we are looking for models of distributed intelligence, ecosystems seem to have much more to teach us than most corporate org charts do.

This is where my own language of ecological intentionality starts to matter. I have been using that phrase to think about the ways intentional life is never merely private or self-enclosed. Consciousness is not a sealed chamber. Perception is not just data processing inside an isolated subject. We come into being through relation with other beings and with the worlds we inhabit. Attention is shaped by place. Meaning emerges through encounter. Even our ethical lives are formed through these layered fields of contact, dependence, and response.

If something like that is true, then perhaps intelligence should not be modeled primarily as command, planning, and execution. Perhaps it should be modeled as situated responsiveness within living networks of relation.

That possibility opens up some fascinating questions for AI design.

What would it mean to build systems where agents do not simply send messages to one another, but interact through a shared evolving substrate, more like soil than chat? What if some agents moved slowly, preserving long memory and stable patterns, while others reacted quickly to changing local conditions? What if resource limits were not treated as inconveniences to be engineered away, but as essential features that shape meaningful behavior? What if forgetting, decay, and succession were not failures, but necessary parts of a healthy cognitive ecology?

These are not just technical questions. They are philosophical and theological ones as well. The systems we build reflect the worldviews we carry. If we assume intelligence is best expressed through extraction, optimization, and control, then our tools will almost certainly reproduce those habits. If, on the other hand, we begin from interdependence, vulnerability, partial knowledge, and relational emergence, then different kinds of systems become imaginable.

I suspect this is one reason ecology has become so important to me as more than a scientific discipline. Ecology is not only about organisms and environments. It is also a way of seeing. It teaches us to pay attention to entanglement, to limits, to reciprocity, and to the unseen structures that make visible life possible. In that sense, ecological thought has something to say not only about forests and watersheds and soils, but also about computation, cognition, and the kinds of futures we are building.

I do not think we should romanticize ecosystems. Forests are not sentimental places. They are full of competition, waste, death, asymmetry, and contingency. But neither are they simple machines. They endure because they are adaptive, layered, and relational. They hold difference together without collapsing it into uniformity. They create the conditions for life through constant negotiation rather than total command.

That may be a better image for intelligence than either the group chat or the throne room.

I keep thinking here of the black walnut in my backyard in Spartanburg. Over the course of a year, I have spent a lot of time watching that tree, writing about it, tracking its changes, learning again how much of life unfolds at speeds we rarely honor. The tree itself is only part of the story. The real story includes the red clay, the fungal threads, the decaying leaves, the insects, the moisture, the other plants nearby, and the long memory of a place becoming what it is over time. Nothing there makes sense in isolation.

Perhaps intelligence is like that, too. Perhaps what we need next in AI is not flatter systems or stricter hierarchies, but deeper ecologies.

That would require more than a new engineering pattern. It would require a different imagination. We would have to stop thinking of intelligence as something that sits inside a unit and starts thinking of it as something that happens in the field between beings, across timescales, under conditions of mutual dependence and constraint.

That seems to me not only more faithful to the living world, but maybe more faithful to us as well.

If artificial intelligence is going to have a future worth inhabiting, I suspect it will not be because we taught machines to behave like emperors. It may be because we finally learned to build with a little more humility, from the patterns of soil, roots, trees, and the fragile worlds they make together.

“Completely off the scale for March”

We need to change our perception with ecological intentionality…

Western U.S. heat wave is historic. Here’s what scientists say:

In the modern era of routine weather balloon measurements, which stretches back to the 1940s, no March heat wave comes close to what unfolded across the Southwest this week, Schumacher said. Earlier March heat waves did occur, including significant events in 1907 and 1910, but neither appears to match this one in strength or duration.

The closest comparison, in terms of how far temperatures departed from normal, is the June 2021 heat dome that shattered all-time records across the Pacific Northwest and British Columbia. Weather historian Christopher Burt called that event “probably one of the greatest anomalous weather events in world history, not just U.S. history.”

OpenClaw Soil

Maybe we should be looking to soil and microbial networks for our multi-agentic frameworks rather than human constructed (and flawed) org charts…

OpenClaw Emperors – by JingYu – ChinaTalk:

This brings us to one of the most fascinating phenomena currently tearing up the developer ecosystem: the wildly popular open-source project on GitHub known as “Edict” (三省六部).

While developers have spent the last year building Multi-Agent frameworks (like AutoGen or CrewAI) based on the principles of Silicon Valley flat hierarchies —throwing five AI agents into a “group chat” to brainstorm and hoping for the best — a community of Chinese developers took a radically different approach. They looked past the modern tech paradigms and drew inspiration from the zenith of classical Chinese political architecture: the Three Departments and Six Ministries (三省六部) system, pioneered in the Sui Dynasty and perfected in the Tang.

What the Soil Remembers

There is a black walnut tree in the backyard of our house here in Spartanburg. Every September, it drops its fruit, and the thick green husks split open, staining the ground (and the fingers of our children) dark. The squirrels know the timing better than we do. The tree has been doing this longer than anyone on the street has been alive.

But according to a growing body of research, it has been doing something else during that time too… something largely invisible and harder to name. Beneath the soil, networks of fungal threads connect the roots of the walnut to other plants and organisms in ways scientists are still working to describe. And the question those networks keep raising is not simply biological. It is perceptual. It is asking us whether we know how to pay attention to what is right beneath us.

Earlier this year, a team of researchers at Princeton University working across institutions in the United States and Europe published new findings on mycorrhizal fungi (the microscopic threads that link plant roots underground). Using imaging techniques refined over several years, they mapped not only how the architecture of these underground networks forms, but also the fluid motions occurring inside fungal tubes roughly one-tenth the diameter of a human hair, through which nutrients flow back and forth throughout the organism. These networks move carbon, nitrogen, and phosphorus across remarkable distances through the soil, allowing plants and fungi to exchange resources through a shared infrastructure that predates our street, our city, and the entire textile economy that built it.

As one researcher put it simply, there are all these things happening underground that no one ever thinks about because they cannot see them.

That invisibility is part of what makes this hard to talk about in practical terms. We tend to extend moral consideration to what we can perceive… and the soil beneath the tulip poplars and white oaks lining the creek corridors through Spartanburg is not legible to us in ordinary ways. But legibility is not the same as presence.

The forests surrounding Greenville and Spartanburg sit at a remarkable ecological threshold. The southern Appalachians are considered one of the most biologically diverse regions of the temperate world, according to the South Carolina Native Plant Society, and the Piedmont foothills carry that diversity into the clay-heavy, iron-stained soils that anyone who has gardened here knows immediately. Those soils formed over millions of years as the ancient Appalachians weathered and eroded, leaving behind a mineral complexity that still shapes which species grow where, which fungi partner with which roots, which relationships persist, and which collapse under pressure.

The forests here also carry a complicated history. The mid-twentieth-century abandonment of row crops allowed forests to return to the Piedmont, though not the oak and hickory that typified earlier centuries. Loblolly pine colonized the abandoned cotton fields first. Sweetgum, tulip poplar, and red maple followed. The visible forest changed, but the deeper processes in the soil continued shaping recovery in ways the canopy did not reveal. Seedbanks persisted underground while fungal communities survived in fragments. Mycorrhizal networks that had supported older forests were interrupted but not entirely erased. When we walk through Croft State Park today, or along the Pacolet River corridor, we are moving through forests still rebuilding themselves after those earlier disturbances. The soil carries those histories in its structure and microbial communities. In that sense, the forest remembers… not through anything like human memory, but through ecological processes unfolding across decades.

Plants and fungi developed a partnership lasting over 400 million years, one that may have enabled plants to colonize dry landmasses and transform them into prolific habitats for terrestrial life (Springer). The relationship is not incidental to the forest, but is constitutional. Mycorrhizal fungal networks linking the roots of trees facilitate inter-tree communication via resource sharing, defense signaling, and kin recognition, influencing what researchers describe as sophisticated behavior among neighboring plants (ResearchGate). Some researchers have gone further, exploring what a recent paper in Symbiosis called “extended plant cognition” and the possibility that plants benefit from the cognition and behavior of mycorrhizal fungi to enhance their own survival, including foraging complementarity, expanded perception of the below-ground environment, and shaping the mycorrhizal community to meet survival needs.

The language here is careful and contested, and it should be. This is not the same as saying trees think in the way we do. But the underlying ecological picture is not nothing. Responsiveness within a forest does not appear to reside solely within individual organisms. It emerges through relationships linking plants, fungi, and soil communities in ways that begin to look less like isolated biological transactions and more like what phenomenologists might call a field of distributed perception… awareness that is not located anywhere in particular but present throughout the whole.

I have been exploring this idea in my own writing as ecological intentionality (the practice of attentive presence that recognizes humans as participants in, not observers of, the living world). What the mycorrhizal research keeps returning me to is how thoroughly that participatory logic runs through the forest itself. The sweetgums and beeches, the stands of loblolly along the old field margins, the black walnut in the backyard… each of these participates in a network of exchange that extends through the soil and across time in ways that our usual categories of “individual” and “organism” struggle to hold.

This matters for more than philosophical reasons here in the Upstate. As I wrote earlier this year about Project Spero (the proposed AI data center at the Tyger River Industrial Park), the questions it raised were ultimately about more than megawatts and gallons of water. They were about what kinds of relationships between land, water, and intelligence we are willing to normalize in this place. The project was eventually withdrawn after months of community opposition (a moment of civic attention worth studying carefully). But the broader pressure it represented has not disappeared. Proposals like it will keep arriving in communities like ours, asking us to decide how much of the landscape’s capacity (including its soil capacity, its fungal capacity, its slow-built ecological memory) should be redirected toward sustaining planetary-scale computation whose primary benefits flow elsewhere.

The question for a forest, if we can ask it that way, is not whether development will come. It is whether the networks beneath the soil can persist through what arrives. Those networks are not infinitely resilient. Mycorrhizal interactions play a foundational role in global patterns and structures of forest diversity, with mycorrhizal tree type systematically mediating the strength of competitive and cooperative dynamics within communities (Nature). What that means at the scale of a particular watershed is that the diversity and responsiveness of a forest depend not only on which species are present aboveground, but on the web of relationships in the soil (many of which are species-specific, many of which take decades to establish, and all of which can be severed quickly).

Donna Haraway has a word I keep returning to in this context, one I thought about recently when writing about the first signs of spring… composting. The idea that life continues through processes of breakdown, recombination, and transformation. Nothing simply disappears. Things are continually folded back into the living systems that surround them. The brown leaves underfoot right now on the trails at Croft carry last year’s sunlight and last year’s rain into the soil that is already shaping what grows next spring. The forest floor is composting memory into future life.

The black walnut in our backyard does not need me to make this argument. It has been making its own version of it for longer than the street has had a name, through a language of carbon, phosphorus, and fungal exchange that we are only beginning to have instruments sensitive enough to partially read.

The question is not whether that language is happening. The question is whether we are willing to develop the kind of attention it requires… and whether we can build that attention into the civic and ecological decisions we are already making about this place.


More Reading…

Simard, Suzanne W., Ryan, Teresa L., and Perry, David A. “Response to Questions About Common Mycorrhizal Networks.” Frontiers in Forests and Global Change (January 2025). https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/forests-and-global-change/articles/10.3389/ffgc.2024.1512518/full

Ma, Xiaofan and Limpens, Erik. “Networking via Mycorrhizae.” Frontiers in Agricultural Science and Engineering 12, no. 1 (2025): 37–46. https://journal.hep.com.cn/fase/EN/10.15302/J-FASE-2024578

“Research Reveals the Underground Traffic Between Fungi and Plants.” Princeton University, March 25, 2025. https://www.princeton.edu/news/2025/03/25/research-reveals-underground-traffic-between-fungi-and-plants

Leyval, C. et al. “How Mycorrhizal Fungi Could Extend Plant Cognitive Processes.” Symbiosis (2025). https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13199-025-01065-y

Society for the Protection of Underground Networks (SPUN) — Global Mycorrhizal Mapping Initiative: https://spun.earth

South Carolina Native Plant Society — Upstate Chapter https://scnps.org/upstate